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Should Elected Officials Have a Property
Interest in Their Positions?
Mark R. Fitzgeraldt
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
protects an individual's interests in life, liberty, and "property."'
Over the years, the definition of "property" has evolved to include
more than such simple tangible interests as land or chattels.2
Courts now recognize new breeds of property interests, including
property interests in an individual's employment.'
Where the individual's employment consists of service as an
elected official, recognizing a property interest becomes problem-
atic. Some courts, for example, have found that because states
create elected offices by defining the terms of these offices in
constitutions, statutes, and ordinances, entitlements comprising
property interests arise from the definitions of the offices them-
selves.4 Other courts have found that merely defining the terms
of an office cannot give rise to an entitlement amounting to a
t B.S.E.E. 1987, United States Air Force Academy; M.B.A. Candidate 1996, Universi-
ty of Chicago; J.D. Candidate 1996, University of Chicago.
US Const, Amend XIV, § 1.
2 See Board of Regents of State Colleges v Roth, 408 US 564, 571-72 (1972)(noting
that "property interests protected by procedural due process extend well beyond actual
ownership of real estate, chattels, or money").
' See Perry v Sindermann, 408 US 593 (1972)(finding that a college professor may
have a property interest in employment).
" The question of whether elected officials have property interests in their positions
is a question of state law. Furthermore, since most of the case law addressing this ques-
tion relates to elected offices at the local level of government, this Comment focuses on
cases involving county and municipal elected offices, rather than state or federal posi-
tions. The focus on county and municipal elected offices also stems from a realization that
most states have granted local levels of government the authority to define local elected
offices by ordinance. For example, in a 1990 survey of the states, the United States
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations ("ACIR") found that thirty-seven
states had adopted, by constitution or statute, provisions that granted home rule authori-
ty to counties; forty-eight states had granted this authority to cities. ACIR, Pub No M-
186, State Laws Governing Local Government Structure and Administration 20-21 (1993).
See notes 54-76 and accompanying text.
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property interest. These courts have reasoned that employment
as an elected official is not "employment" at all; instead, an
elected office involves a "position of trust" that does not give rise
to a property right.5
Unfortunately, the courts confronting this issue have focused
only on the semantics and not on the effects of this distinction. In
other words, state courts have disputed only whether elected
offices are more properly characterized as "property" or "trusts,"
and they have failed to address whether the distinction matters.
This Comment concludes that the problem lies not in the charac-
terization of the office as "property" or "trust," but rather in the
practical effects of this characterization.6 These effects are not
trivial-a "property" view of elected offices creates a federal cause
of action and leads to federal jurisdiction over the procedural as-
pects of a state's internal political administration. The "trust"
view, on the other hand, leaves review of purely internal proce-
dural matters to the state.
A good starting point for analyzing this issue is the Supreme
Court's turn-of-the-century decision in Taylor v Beckham,' in
which the Court held that an elected political official had no
property right in his office and, accordingly, that the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee of due process offered him no protection.
Part I of this Comment describes the relevance of this landmark
case and concludes that while Taylor established a default rule of
elected offices as "trusts," states may choose to create stronger
interests, including interests that amount to property rights, in
elected offices.
Part II of this Comment notes that the conception of "proper-
ty" under the Fourteenth Amendment has evolved to include
much more than the interests at stake in 1900, the year the
Supreme Court decided Taylor. Indeed, the Supreme Court's
1972 decision in Board of Regents of State Colleges v Roth,'
See notes 77-96 and accompanying text.
This Comment only addresses the question of whether the right to hold a public
office is itself "property" under the Due Process Clause. This question arises in situations
involving the questionable removal of an elected official from office and the removed
official's subsequent claim for equitable relief. This Comment assumes that the denial of
the salary, benefits, and other emoluments of office, as distinct from the right to hold the
office itself, may give rise to a claim for monetary damages, but the Comment does not
address these monetary claims. The question of whether elected offices are "property"
under the Due Process Clause is also distinct from the inquiry into what actions consti-
tute "due process of the law." This latter inquiry is beyond the scope of this Comment.
178 US 548 (1900).
' 408 US at 577.
PROPERTY INTEREST
suggests that for Fourteenth Amendment purposes, any grant of
"entitlement" under state law may constitute "property." Part II
of this Comment argues that neither Roth nor the historical evo-
lution of the conception of property have altered the default rule
in Taylor. Nevertheless, the choice of "trust" versus "property"
does have at least one practical effect: the creation or negation of
a federal due process claim, as opposed to a state claim.
Taylor and Roth have created confusion among the state
courts, and the states have split over whether to treat elected
offices as the property of the officeholder or as a public position
of trust. Part III reviews this dichotomy and finds that neither
side of the argument adequately addresses the practical implica-
tions of the choice.
Part IV discusses possible interpretations of the holdings in
Taylor and Roth in light of the confusion in the lower courts, and
suggests that the property/trust distinction is meaningful in two
respects. First, the "trust" view leaves jurisdiction over state
politics with the states, while the "property" view creates federal
jurisdiction. Second, the "trust" view allows the state legislature
to exercise control over the political process while allowing for
state judicial review of abuses of power; the "property" view
hinders legislative control.
The Supreme Court has left the choice of viewing elected
offices as "property" or "trusts" to the states. The problem is that
state courts have assumed that this choice is appropriately
decided in the state judiciaries, thereby denying the state
legislatures' role in the choice. Furthermore, those states that
have chosen the "property" view have created federal jurisdiction
over political procedural matters that are more properly reviewed
at the state level. This Comment concludes that while states may
choose to recognize a property interest in an elected office, it is
not in a state's interest to do so. States that view elected offices
as trusts rather than as property interests secure greater legisla-
tive control over the political process while retaining judicial
review of abuses in the state, rather than federal, courts. State
courts should therefore accede to the default view of elected
offices as trusts and should not recognize property interests
unless the state legislature has affirmatively created such inter-
ests.
365]
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I. THE DEFAULT RULE OF NONRECOGNITION OF PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN ELECTED OFFICES
The issue of property rights in elected offices is not merely a
matter of recent interest. Early Supreme Court decisions ad-
dressed this issue and held that elected officials do not have
inherent property interests in their positions.' In the landmark
case of Taylor v Beckham,' ° the Court held that "the nature of
the relation of a public officer to the public is inconsistent with
either a property or a contract right." At issue in Taylor was
whether an allegedly fraudulent vote recount deprived a recently
elected Kentucky governor of a property interest in his office
without due process of the law.1 The Court declined to assert
jurisdiction because the case involved no Fourteenth Amendment
property right. 2 The Taylor Court reasoned:
The decisions are numerous to the effect that public
offices are mere agencies or trusts, and not property as
such .... Nor does the fact that a constitution may
forbid the legislature from abolishing a public office or
diminishing the salary thereof during the term of the
incumbent change its character or make it property."
The Court thus refused to acknowledge a property interest in the
governor's elected position.
Taylor, however, did not go so far as to deny states the pow-
er to choose to create property interests in elected offices. 4 In-
deed, the Taylor Court clearly expressed its desire to leave power
over political processes exclusively with the- states.'" Thus, the
Court's statement in Taylor that "public offices are mere agencies
or trusts, and not property"" applies only as a default rule in
the absence of a contrary state definition. States may choose to
See Snowden v Hughes, 321 US 1, 7 (1944)(finding that the right to state political
office is not a right of property); Taylor v Beckham, 178 US 548, 577 (1900)(holding that
public offices are not property interests); Wilson v North Carolina, 169 US 586, 595
(1898)(finding that the suspension of an elected railroad commissioner did not constitute
deprivation of property without due process of law).
10 178 US at 577 (footnote omitted).
See generally id at 549-70.
1 Id at 580.
13 Id at 577.
14 See Errichetti v Merlino, 188 NJ Super 309, 335-37, 457 A2d 476, 490-91
(1982)(arguing that the Taylor Court merely set minimum requirements that states can
choose to override).
Taylor, 178 US at 570-71.
16 Id at 577.
PROPERTY INTEREST
create stronger interests, including interests that amount to
property rights, in elected offices; in effect, states may treat
Taylor as only a "minimum requirement."17
Unfortunately, the Taylor Court failed to specify how a state
might show that it has chosen to create a property interest in an
elected office. The only guidance the Court offered was that, at
least in 1900, "the fact that a [state's] constitution [prohibited]
the legislature from abolishing a public office... during the term
of the incumbent" was not enough to show that a state had cho-
sen to create a property interest in that office." In other words,
if Taylor is still good law, then a state must do more than merely
define the length of the term of an elected office if the state de-
sires to create a property interest in that office.
Although a lower court has recently questioned Taylor's
modern-day impact, 9 the Supreme Court has never expressly
overruled Taylor.2" However, in Fourteenth Amendment terms,
"property" had a different meaning in 1900 than it does today.2
II. THE DEFINITION OF "PROPERTY" HAS EVOLVED, BUT THAT
EVOLUTION HAS NOT DISTURBED TAYLOR'S BASIc PROPOSITIONS
Taylor v Beckham22 advanced two basic propositions rele-
vant to this discussion: (1) unless states choose otherwise, elected
officials have no inherent property interests in their positions;
and (2) states must do more than simply define the length of the
term of an office in order to create a property interest in the
"7 See Errichetti, 188 NJ Super at 335-37 (describing the "minimum requirement"
argument).
18 Taylor, 178 US at 577.
1 Brown v Perkins, 706 F Supp 633, 634 (N D Ill 1989).
While the Supreme Court has never expressly overruled Taylor, a 1972 Supreme
Court decision may necessitate a review of Taylor's property rights argument from a
modem perspective. See Board of Regents of State Colleges v Roth, 408 US 564 (1972).
However, while Taylor involved an elected office, Roth did not. Furthermore, in a post-
Roth case arising from the contested removal of justices of the peace from their elected
offices, the Supreme Court directed the dismissal of a Fourteenth Amendment claim in
Taylor-like fashion. In Harris County Commissioners Court v Moore, 420 US 77 (1975),
the Court directed the dismissal because the State of Texas had not yet settled the
question of whether its constitution guaranteed the elected justices the right to serve until
the expiration of their terms. Id at 86-89.
"1 As one author has pointed out, "[p]roperty, once seen as a unitary set of absolute
rights over some 'thing,' is now legally depicted as an economic commodity composed of a
bundle of rights, with each stick in the bundle subject to regulation and acquisition."
David A. Schultz, Property, Power, and American Democracy 169 (Transaction Publishers,
1992).
22 178 US 548 (1900).
365]
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office itself.23 The import of these propositions clearly depends
upon the definition of "property." If a state chooses to create a
"property" interest, then it must know what "property" means.
Although the definition of "property" has evolved since the Su-
preme Court's decision in Taylor, the Court's jurisprudence has
remained consistent with these Taylor propositions.
Property interest arguments stem from the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides: "nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law . ,,24 Before Goldberg v Kelly,25 the Su-
preme Court defined property interests in common law terms."
As a result, while "traditional" property such as real estate, chat-
tels, and money fell under the protection of procedural due pro-
cess, more personal, or individual, interests such as employment,
social security benefits, and welfare did not.27
In Goldberg, however, the Court held that a welfare
recipient's interest in his continued receipt of welfare benefits
was a "statutory entitlement" amounting to "property" within the
meaning of the Due Process Clause.28 While the Court's holding
in Goldberg obviously extended the scope of "property" beyond its
traditional meaning, the Court provided neither guidelines nor a
precise definition of what might constitute "property."
29
2' This Comment refers to these two basic premises as "the first Taylor proposition"
and "the second Taylor proposition" throughout parts II, III, and IV. This Comment
proposes these propositions as the most coherent interpretation of Taylor in light of later
Supreme Court decisions discussed in part II.
2' US Const, Amend XIV, § 1.
25 397 US 254 (1970).
2 Geoffrey R. Stone, Louis M. Seidman, Cass R. Sunstein, and MarkV. Tushnet, Consti-
tutional Law 986 (Little, Brown, and Company, 2d ed 1991).
2 As the Supreme Court later noted in Board of Regents of State Colleges v Roth, 408
US 564 (1972) in the post-Goldberg world "property interests protected by procedural due
process extend well beyond actual ownership of real estate, chattels, or money." Id at 571-
72.
2 Goldberg v Kelly, 397 US 254, 262 n 8 (1970).
2 Goldberg was one of the Supreme Court's first steps in the direction of Professor
Reich's translationalist conception of property rights in a modem age. Professor Reich
argued that the meaning of the word "property" in the Fourteenth Amendment has
evolved along with society so that the nineteenth-century word translates to a modern-day
word with broader meaning. See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L J 733
(1964). This Comment accepts the Goldberg conception of "new property" as valid; howev-
er, ambiguities in Goldberg leave the elected-offices-as-property question unanswered.
PROPERTY INTEREST
Board of Regents of State Colleges v Roth"0 set forth stan-
dards for determining which interests are "property" interests
entitled to due process protection. The Roth Court stated:
Certain attributes of "property" interests protected by
procedural due process emerge from [recent decisions
like Goldberg]. To have a property interest in a benefit,
a person clearly must have more than an abstract need
or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral
expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate
claim of entitlement to it. It is a purpose of the ancient
institution of property to protect those claims upon
which people rely in their daily lives, reliance that must
not be arbitrarily undermined. It is a purpose of the
constitutional right to a hearing to provide an opportu-
nity for a person to vindicate those claims."'
Thus, a property interest is more than a mere "unilateral expec-
tation"; it is a "legitimate claim of entitlement," a claim that falls
under the protection of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The Roth Court also described the source of these "entitle-
ment" claims:
Property interests, of course, are not created by the
Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimen-
sions are defined by existing rules or understandings
that stem from an independent source such as state
law-rules or understandings that secure certain bene-
fits and that support claims of entitlement to those
benefits. 2
Thus, a property interest is not necessarily a natural right, but
may be an entitlement explicitly created by some independent
source. For instance, a property interest "can... be created by
ordinance, or by an implied contract. In either case, however, the
sufficiency of the claim of entitlement must be decided by refer-
ence to state. law."3 This reasoning accords with Taylor's first
'o 408 US at 564.
31 Id at 577 (emphasis added).
3 Id.
Bishop v Wood, 426 US 341, 344 (1976) (footnotes omitted). The Court's statement
in Bishop suggests that state law governs all definitions of "property." While this sugges-
tion may be true for ordinances, state statutes, and contracts, Roth allows other "inde-
pendent sources" to create property interests. For example, federal law is the generative
365]
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proposition that a state must choose to create a property interest
in an elected office.
Since Roth, the courts have held that a variety of nontradi-
tional property interests, including employee interests in public
employment, constitute "entitlements" cognizable under the Due
Process Clause." By extension, if "employment" as an elected
official constitutes "public employment," then elected officials
may also have property interests in their positions, if these posi-
tions are the product of the state's constitution or legislation."5
As noted earlier, the Taylor Court did not deny states the
power to choose to create property interests in elected offices."
Furthermore, Roth does not compel a modification of Taylor's
second proposition that simply defining the terms of an office will
not create a property interest. Roth does not even mention Taylor
or elected offices, and even the evolved "property" definition does
not suggest that merely defining the terms of an office will create
a cognizable property right in that office. However, some courts
in the post-Roth world have abandoned Taylor's second proposi-
tion and have held that a property right exists in an elected
office even where the state has only defined the office's term of
service.37
Roth does not justify this abandonment of Taylor's second
proposition by courts recognizing property interests springing
from the mere definition of elected offices' terms. To the contrary,
source for interests in intellectual property such as patents and copyrights. See US Const,
Art I, § 8 (granting Congress the power to pass laws creating certain intellectual property
rights).
See Cleveland Board of Education v Loudermill, 470 US 532 (1985)(recognizing a
property interest in public employment); Perry v Sindermann, 408 US 593 (1972)(fimding
a property interest in employment); Bell v Burson, 402 US 535 (1971)(finding a property
interest in a license to drive).
3' Some state courts recognized a property interest in elected office even before Roth.
See State ex rel Landis v Tedder, 106 Fla 140, 146, 143 S 148, 150 (1932Xstating that
"[t]his Court is committed to the doctrine that a public officer has a property right in his
tenure of office and cannot be deprived thereof without due process of law."). Taylor's first
proposition-that states may affirmatively choose to recognize such property
rights---supports this outcome.
See Errichetti v Merlino, 188 NJ Super 309, 335-37, 457 A2d 476, 490-91
(1982)(arguing that the Taylor Court merely set minimum requirements that states can
choose to override).
" See Crowe v Lucas, 595 F2d 985, 993 (5th Cir 1979)(recognizing a property interest
in an elected office where the relevant statute stated: "All officers elected at the general
municipal election... shall qualify and enter upon the discharge of their duties... and
shall hold their offices for a term of four years and until their successors are duly elected
and qualified"). See also Fredericks v Vartanian, 529 F Supp 264, 267 (D Mass
1981)(noting that the statute in Crowe explicitly created an entitlement to the elected
office).
PROPERTY INTEREST
Roth may implicitly support Taylor's second proposition. That is,
the Roth Court noted that "[p]roperty interests, of course, are not
created by the Constitution."38 Although the Court made this
note in reference to the Fourteenth Amendment, it could equally
apply to Article II, Section 1, which states: "[The] President of
the United States of America... shall hold his Office during the
[tierm of four [y]ears .... ."" It seems odd that the Roth Court
would allow recognition of a property interest in state offices
defined in these terms in state constitutions, while apparently
declining to recognize a property interest in analogous federal
offices defined in the United States Constitution.
The Supreme Court's post-Roth holding in Harris County
Commissioners Court v Moore,40 further suggests that Roth does
not invalidate Taylor's second proposition that simply defining
the terms of an office will not create a property interest. In
Moore, a Texas redistricting plan resulted in the removal of three
justices of the peace and two constables from their elected offices
before the expiration of their terms.41 Because Texas courts had
not yet settled the question of whether that state's constitution
guaranteed the terms of these elected officials, the Supreme
Court directed the dismissal of the complaint, denying the
officials' Fourteenth Amendment claims.42
Although the Moore Court made no reference to Taylor or
Roth and did not directly address the property-rights question,
the Court's dismissal of the claim was essentially due to the lack
of a clear Fourteenth Amendment property interest. The Texas
Constitution defined the terms of the offices by providing that an
elected justice of the peace or constable "shall hold his office for
four years and until his successor shall be elected and quali-
fied."' The constitution further provided that these elected offi-
cials "may be removed by state district court judges for various
Roth, 408 US at 577.
US Const, Art II, § 1.
'0 420 US 77 (1975).
Id at 78.
42 Id at 86-89.
Id at 85, citing TX Conast, Art V, § 18.
365]
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causes, after notice and a trial by jury."" Despite these constitu-
tional provisions, the redistricting plan, in combination with a
Texas statute," resulted in the removal of the elected officials
without notice and without a trial."
The Moore Court focused on the unsettled nature of the
officials' interests in their offices. 4' The mere existence of Texas
constitutional provisions for terms of office and removal was not
enough to settle the question of whether the elected officials had
interests in remaining in office until completion of their elected
terms." Accordingly, the Court's dismissal of the federal claim
evinced a clear refusal to acknowledge Fourteenth Amendment
claims where the states have only ambiguously signaled their
choice of whether elected offices constitute property interests.
The Court's dismissal in Moore echoes its refusal of jurisdiction
in Taylor and further supports Taylor's second proposition that a
state must do more than simply define an elected official's term
of office if the state wishes to create a property right in that of-
fice.
III. ABSENCE OF COMPELLING REASONS FOR CHOOSING TO VIEW
ELECTED POSITIONS AS EITHER "PROPERTY" OR "TRUSTS"
The Taylor v Beckham4" propositions-that states may
choose to create property interests in elected offices and that
merely defining the terms of offices will not suffice to create such
interests-raise two questions. First, what significance does the
choice of viewing elected offices as "property" or "trusts" hold?
Second, given the Taylor propositions, as reinforced by Harris
County Commissioners Court v Moore,5° how can states that
Moore, 420 US at 85, citing TX Const, Art V, § 24.
4' The statute provided, in pertinent part, that after redistricting, "[i]f more than one
justice or constable resides within a precinct [altered or formed by the redistrict-
ing]... the office shall become vacant and the vacancy shall be filled as other vacancies
." Id at 79-80 n 1, citing Tex Rev Civ Stat Ann § 2351 1/2 (c) (Vernon 1971).
The elected officials in Moore found themselves threatened with removal by opera-
tion of the existing redistricting statute, rather than by operation of a hearing or trial.
After redistricting, four justices and three constables were residents of a newly formed
single precinct that allowed for only two justices and one constable. Moore, 420 US at 79-
80.
" Id at 85-88.
SId at 85.
49 178 US 548 (1900).
'0 420 US 77 (1975).
PROPERTY INTEREST
choose "property" signal this choice? The courts have inadequate-
ly answered the first inquiry and completely failed to address the
second.
The question of whether states should choose to view elected
offices as "property" or to accept the default view of offices as
"trusts" is meaningless unless the choice has a practical effect.
Unfortunately, the states that have addressed this issue have not
adequately explained the consequences of choosing one view or
the other. A minority of the states favor the "property" view.51
However, these states have relied on empty precedent that offers
no underlying reasoning for the preference of "property" over
"trust" and no discussion of the consequences of this procedure.
Similarly, states that have adopted the default "trust" view have
offered no meaningful justification for adopting "trust" over
"property," other than mere rhetoric that avoids any meaningful
commentary on the implications of the choice.
Thus, until 1984, when the Delaware Supreme Court ad-
dressed the property/trust distinction in Slawik v State,52 the
distinction seemed to lack import. That court suggested, however,
that the distinction has at least one clear implication. Choosing
"property" creates a federal due process claim and consequent
federal review of those state procedures that affect elected offi-
cials. The default "trust" regime, on the other hand, leaves proce-
dural review to the states and affords states greater latitude in
local political processes." Unfortunately, apart from Slawik, the
courts that have addressed the property/trust distinction have
not commented on the importance of this implication.
A. "Property" States Have Relied on Empty Precedent
The state courts and those federal courts applying state law
that have chosen to view elected offices as the property of the
officeholder have not provided much rationale for that choice.
While these courts justify the view of elected offices as "property"
rather than "trusts" by applying questionable legal precedent,
they fail to elucidate a guiding principle underlying the choice. A
" See Slawik v State, 480 A2d 636, 644 (Del 1984)("[T]he 'majority' rule concerning
the nature of public office" is that elected offices are not "property").
62 Id.
' Local political procedures for removing elected officials are subject to federal re-
view under the "property" view and state review under the "trust" view. See notes 85-96
and accompanying text.
365]
376 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1995:
number of cases have cited either Crowe v Lucas5 or Gordon v
Leatherman55 for the proposition that elected officials have prop-
erty interests in their elected offices. 6 Yet, while both Crowe
and Gordon advance this proposition, neither provides a clear
rationale for its application or any discussion of the implications
of instead viewing elected offices as trusts.57 Both cases fail to
explain why a "property" regime is preferable to a "trust" regime.
Crowe5 involved a sitting Mississippi alderman who lost his
bid for reelection. 9 After losing the reelection bid, the alderman
asserted election fraud, and a Mississippi county court declared
the election null and void.6" The defendants in Crowe, however,
595 F2d 985 (5th Cir 1979).
450 F2d 562 (5th Cir 1971).
See Brown v Perkins, 706 F Supp 633, 634 (N D Ill 1989)(citing both Crowe v Lucas
and Gordon v Leatherman in noting that "lower courts in recent years have assumed" that
elected officials may have property interests in their offices when state law so grants an
entitlement); Fredericks v Vartanian, 529 F Supp 264, 267 (D Mass 1981Xciting Crowe as
an example of a state statute creating a property interest in an elected office); City of
Ludowici v Stapleton, 258 Ga 868, 869, 375 SE2d 855, 856 (1989)(citing Crowe in holding
that a mayor had a property interest in his elected office); Eaves v Harris, 258 Ga 1, 3,
364 SE2d 854, 857 (1988)(citing Gordon while recognizing that a county commissioner
"has a constitutional right to hold the public office to which he has been duly elected and
that he cannot be deprived of that right through state action without due process of the
law"). See also Collins v Morris, 263 Ga 734, 735, 438 SE2d 896, 897 (1994)(citing
Stapleton in recognition of elected officials' property interests in their offices).
"7 Other federal and state cases have advanced this proposition, but they too fail to
explain the practical effects of treating elected offices as property interests rather than as
trusts. See Moore v Harris County Commissioners Court, 378 F Supp 1006, 1007-08 (S D
Tex 1974)(holding that elected justices of the peace may have property interests), rev'd,
420 US at 77. Moore's reversal suggests one practical effect of the property/trust distinc-
tion-federal courts may lack jurisdiction if a property interest is not clearly implicated.
But the courts have not argued why, or if, federal jurisdiction is "better" than state
jurisdiction. See also McKinney v Kaminsky, 340 F Supp 289, 294 (M D Ala 1972)(finding
that election candidate had property interest); Gordon v Leatherman, 325 F Supp 494, 497
(S D Fla 1971)(deciding that county commissioner had property interest in his public
office); Fair v Kirk, 317 F Supp 12, 14 (N D Fla 1970)(deciding that county supervisor of
elections had property interest in elected office). State courts that have recognized proper-
ty interests in elected offices include: Florida, Georgia, New Jersey, and Tennessee. See
Richard v Tomlinson, 49 S2d 798, 799 (Fla 1951)(finding that councilman had property
interest in elected office); State ex rel Landis v Tedder, 106 Fla 140, 146, 143 S 148, 150
(1932Xdeciding that city commissioner had property interest in his public office); State ex
rel Hatton v Joughin, 103 Fla 877, 881, 138 S 392, 395 (1931)(finding that elected sheriff
had property interest in elected position); Piver v Stallman, 198 S2d 859, 862 (Fla App
1967)(deciding that elected councilman had property interest in his office); Stapleton, 258
Ga at 869, 375 SE2d at 856 (finding that mayor had property interest in elected office);
Errichetti v Merlino, 188 NJ Super 309, 335-37, 457 A2d 476, 490-91 (1982)(deciding that
state senator had property interest); Butler v Cocke County, 671 SW2d 847, 848 (Tern
App 1984)(finding that elected county executive had property interest in his office).




refused to allow the alderman to return to his office."' The al-
derman argued that the defendants violated his constitutional
rights by depriving him of his property interest in his office with-
out due process.62 The Crowe court, without explaining its rea-
soning, held:
An elected city official who is entitled to hold an office
under state law has a property interest in his office
which can be taken from him only by procedures meeting
the requirements of due process. The record here shows
that the defendants acted wrongfully to deny Crowe his
rights as an Alderman. The jury thus could reasonably
have found that they deprived Crowe of due process of
law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.63
The Crowe court offered no explanation why Mississippi should
prefer to view elected offices as "property" rather than as
"trusts." The precedent cited by the court similarly failed to pro-
vide either a rationale for this distinction or a discussion of its
practical effect. The Crowe court cited Gordon" for the proposi-
tion that elected officials may have property interests in their
offices, but a review of the Gordon opinion offers no additional
explanation of the underlying rationale or effect.65
In Gordon," the Fifth Circuit first noted that the "plaintiff,
as an elected official, 'has a property right in his office which
cannot be taken away except by due process of law.'"67 Unfor-
tunately, the Court's only support for this proposition was an
ambiguous and equally unsupported statement:
That statement [that an elected official has a property
right in his office which cannot be taken away except by
due process of law] is correct so far as it goes. But it is
61 Id.
Crowe, 595 F2d at 992-93.
Id at 993 (citations omitted)(emphasis added).
Id, citing Gordon, 450 F2d at 565.
See Gordon, 450 F2d at 565.
Gordon involved a "recall election" in which more than ten thousand voters in
Dade County, Florida, petitioned to hold an election to recall a county commissioner from
office. Id at 563. The county commissioner, Alex Gordon, argued that the recall procedure
deprived him of a property right in his public office, without due process of law. Id. The
district court enjoined the recall election from proceeding, and the petitioners appealed.
Id.
Gordon, 450 F2d at 565 (citation omitted). A distinct but related inquiry asks what
constitutes sufficient "due process of law" in Commissioner Gordon's case. This inquiry,
while important, is beyond the scope of this Comment.
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also true that an official takes his office subject to the
conditions imposed by the terms and nature of the polit-
ical system in which he operates."8
Thus Gordon, the case that serves as the foundation for the prop-
osition that elected officials have property interests in their posi-
tions, provides no justification for that proposition, except that
the proposition is "correct so far as it goes." 9
Still, the proposition is not entirely without support. The
lower court opinion in Gordon v Leatherman° cited a line of
older Florida cases holding that elected officials have property
rights cognizable under the Fourteenth Amendment.7 These
cases, however, similarly failed to go beyond the bald statement
that such a property right exists; no enlightened reasoning shines
through any of these older decisions.72 Moreover, these decisions
shed no light on why a "property" regime might be preferable to a
"trust" regime.
One justification for the proposition that elected offices com-
prise property rights comes from a historical perspective, but the
argument has limited value as a reason why states today should
choose the "property" view. As the Supreme Court of Georgia
noted in Edge v Holcomb,73 "a careful study ... discloses that in
the early history of the English jurisprudence the right to hold
office was regarded as a property right, and many decisions were
made in recognition of this principle ... ." Thus, at least in the
pre-Roth decisions," property rights in elected offices may be
holdovers from the English feudal system of property grants to
royal officers. Indeed, sixteenth-century England witnessed the
purchase and sale of judicial offices;75 grants of rights to office
in exchange for bribes were prevalent throughout the eighteenth




'o Gordon, 325 F Supp at 494.
71 Id at 497, citing Hatton, 103 Fla at 138 S 392; Landis, 106 Fla at 143 S 148; Piver,
198 S2d at 859; Fair, 317 F Supp at 12.
72 See Joughin, 103 Fla at 881, 138 S at 395; Tedder, 106 Fla at 146, 143 S at 150;
Piver, 198 S2d at 862; Fair, 317 F Supp at 14.
71 135 Ga 765, 767-68, 70 SE 644, 645 (1911).
7' Board of Regents of State Colleges v Roth, 408 US 564, 577 (1972).
" W. S. Holdsworth, 1 A History of English Law 250-51 (Little, Brown, and Compa-
ny, 4th ed 1931).
"' Id at 439-41.
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B. "Trust" States Have Relied on Mere Rhetoric
Most courts have either questioned or rejected the proposi-
tion that elected officials have property interests in their posi-
tions; these courts have instead adopted Taylor's default view of
elected offices as "trusts."77 The reasoning underlying these
courts' opinions stems from an assertion that the employment of
elected officials somehow differs qualitatively from other employ-
ment. But the states proffering this view, like the states that
view elected offices as "property," fail to justify the significance of
the distinction. Rather than relying on empty precedent, howev-
er, these "trust" states rely on empty rhetoric.
For example, in Rabkin v Dean," a federal district court
applying California law found that an elected city auditor had no
protected property interest in her job and dismissed her claim
with prejudice. The Court based its holding on the unsupported
proposition that an elected official is not an "employee" and
therefore could not have a property interest in her employ-
ment.79 Similarly, in Sweeney v Tucker,s° the Court held that
"[iut is questionable whether [an elected official's] interest in his
office is a property interest." The Court reasoned:
An elected office is a public trust, not the private do-
main of the officeholder. A member of the Legisla-
ture. . . holds office for the benefit of his constituents
and cannot justifiably rely on a private need or expecta-
tion in holding office .... [T]he public interest in the
office far outweighs any private interest of the office-
holder."s
Thus, the Court in Sweeney suggested that "employment" as an
elected official is not really "employment" at all. The opinions in
Rabkin and Sweeney suggest that an elected office, as a "position
of trust" and not a position of employment, cannot comprise
The majority rule is that elected offices are not "property." See Slawik, 480 A2d at
644. Both federal and state courts have followed this view, or at least questioned the
merits of the opposing view. See Rabkin v Dean, 856 F Supp 543 (N D Cal 1994); Roth v
Cuevas, 603 NYS2d 962 (NY Sup Ct 1993); Bartow v Harbal, 1991 WL 127565 (Ohio App);
Burrage v New Hampshire Police Standards and Training Council, 127 NH 742, 506 A2d
342 (1986); Sweeney v Tucker, 473 Pa 493, 375 A2d 698 (1977). For other jurisdictions
following this "majority rule," see Slawik, 480 A2d at 644 n 9.
" 856 F Supp at 549.
7 Id.
0 473 Pa at 524, 375 A2d at 713.
81 Id.
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"property." But the opinions offer neither precedent nor an expla-
nation of the implications of viewing elected offices as "trusts"
rather than as "property."
These opinions echo Judge Bork's reasoning in his dissent in
Barnes v Kline:2
[Tihat elected representatives have a separate private
right, akin to a property interest, in the powers of their
offices ... is a notion alien to the concept of a republi-
can form of government. It has always been the theory,
and it is more than a metaphor, that a democratic rep-
resentative holds his office in trust, that he is nothing
more nor less than a fiduciary of the people. Indeed,...
the Framers of the Constitution most certainly did not
intend to allow [representatives of the people to bring
suit when the people themselves have no standing to
sue], which means they did not conceive of the powers
of elected representatives as apart from the powers of
the electorate.83
Although the Barnes majority dealt only tangentially with the
property interest issue, Judge Bork's dissent in Barnes summa-
rizes the issue from the perspective of the "trust" states; those
who run for office should do so in pursuit of the common good,
rather than in pursuit of personal interests in compensation.8
Even if this reasoning is valid, it does not lead to an obvious
preference for the "trust" view over the "property" view. The
critical inquiry is whether the distinction has a practical effect,
and the rhetoric promulgated in these "trust" cases does not re-
spond to this query.
C. The Importance of the Property/Trust Distinction in the
Context of Federal Jurisdiction over Due Process Violations
At least one "trust" state has illustrated a possible implica-
tion of the property/trust distinction, albeit through a confusing
759 F2d 21, 50 (DC Cir 1984)(Bork dissenting). Though Barnes v Kline dealt only
tangentially with the property interest issue, the reasoning in Judge Bork's dissent is illu-
minating.
' Id. Judge Bork's reasoning assumed, as the majority in Barnes held, that the
electorate has no standing to sue.
"' One might argue that the same reasoning applies to civil servants, military person-
nel, teachers, or other groups that have successfully asserted property rights in their posi-
tions. Although they are not elected officials, professionals in these positions presumably
act primarily for the common good rather than for personal gain.
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approach with perhaps an unintended result. While in Slawik v
State," the Delaware Supreme Court held that a public office is
a position of trust and not "property" under the Fourteenth
Amendment,86 it nonetheless reviewed the substantiality of the
alleged denial of due process rights because, as the Court
claimed, Roth had extended due process to include any loss of
"entitlement."87 In its struggle to provide some level of state due
process protection to elected officials without acknowledging a
Fourteenth Amendment property interest in their offices, the
Slawik court revealed a practical distinction between the effects
of viewing elected offices as "property" and the effects of treating
them as "trusts." If the elected office were viewed as "property,"
then the federal courts would have had jurisdiction. Viewing the
office as a "trust" position enabled the Slawik court to deny fed-
eral jurisdiction and reverse a prior award of Slawik's attorney's
fees."
Slawik was an elected county executive who argued that the
governor of Delaware had deprived him of a property right in his
office without due process.89 Acting in accordance with the Dela-
ware Constitution, the governor had removed Slawik from office
following Slawik's conviction for making false declarations before
a federal grand jury.0 Slawik's conviction was later reversed,91
and subsequently he filed suit against the state of Delaware,
contending that he had a "property" interest in completing his
full term of elected office.92
After opining that Roth and its progeny did not displace
Taylor,3 the Delaware Supreme Court held:
[A] public officer in this State takes his position under
the aegis and for the benefit of the public, subject to
suspension or removal by any constitutionally permissi-
ble means. The office is in the nature of a public trust
created to serve the public interest and not the private
advantage of the individual officer."
8 480 A2d at 636.
Id at 644-45.
87 Id at 645.
Id at 639, 647.
Slawik, 480 A2d at 638.
90 Id.
" United States v Slawik, 548 F2d 75 (3d Cir 1977).
Slawik, 480 A2d at 638.
Id at 643 n S.
Id at 644 (footnote omitted).
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The Slawik court, however, wanted to ensure that public
officials would not be summarily dismissed without reason in the
future. Therefore, it suggested that although the plaintiff had no
"property" interest cognizable under the Fourteenth Amendment,
the plaintiff had "a legitimate claim of entitlement" that required
some lesser amount of procedural due process protection.95 The
court thus implied that Roth may have created a new Fourteenth
Amendment category, that of "entitlement," which is either dis-
tinct from, or encompassing of, "life, liberty, and property." How-
ever, the court ruled that even if such an entitlement existed in
Slawik's case, it did not create a "substantial" interest that war-
ranted federal jurisdiction."
A necessary, though perhaps unintended, implication of
Slawik is that viewing elected offices as "trusts" allows states to
control local political processes without worrying about federal
review of due process. A "trust" state may thus review elected
officials' due process claims under a different standard than a
federal court might use.
IV. THE LAW OF TRUSTS SUGGESTS THAT THE "TRUST" VIEW IS
PREFERABLE TO THE "PROPERTY" VIEW
This Comment posited two questions at the beginning of part
III: first, what significance does the choice of viewing elected of-
fices as "property" or "trusts" hold; and second, given the Taylor v
Beckham97 propositions, as reinforced by the result in Harris
County Commissioners Court v Moore, 8 how can states that
choose "property" signal this choice? Although the courts have
not answered these questions, it seems clear from Slawik v
State" that the choice of "property" or "trusts" will affect wheth-
er elected officials will have federal due process claims whenever
they are removed from office. In response to the first question,
then, the critical implications of viewing elected offices as "trusts"
rather than "property" are that review of political procedural
matters remains with the states, and that such procedural mat-
ters are not subject to federal standards of review. Furthermore,
given Taylor's default rule that elected offices, are trusts unless a
state chooses otherwise, and, as discussed below, given that the
" Id at 645.
Slawik, 480 A2d at 647.
97 178 US 548 (1900).
" 420 US 77 (1975).
'9 480 A2d 636 (Del 1984).
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law of trusts allows state courts to review abuses of removal pow-
er, the second question might more properly be, "Why would
states ever choose to signal a choice of 'property?' Under the fol-
lowing analysis, states should never choose to create property
interests in elected offices.
The Slawik decision implied that a federal court might favor
the plaintiff in a due process claim, while a state court might be
more interested in maintaining its control over the political pro-
cess in exchange for a lower level of due process."° Thus, at one
level, the implication of the property/trust distinction is that the
"trust" view keeps control of the political processes with the
states, while the "property" view shifts ultimate control to the
federal courts.
On a more local level, however, the distinction impacts upon
whether control over political processes lies in the state and fed-
eral courts or in the state legislatures. This practical effect of a
state's choice of "property" over "trust" surfaces from an analysis
of the apparently contradictory holdings in Taylor, Roth, and
lower court opinions like the one in Slawik, and from an applica-
tion of the law of trusts.
Taylor, Roth, and the Delaware court's confusing opinion in
Slawik, taken together, suggest at least four different views of
the effects of a state's choice of "property" over "trust." While the
first three views cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Court
decisions, the fourth view suggests a coherent theory applying
the law of trusts. The law of trusts provides a framework for
deciding the property/trust question and, as will be discussed
below, strongly suggests that it is never in a state's interests to
choose the "property" regime.
The first view suggests that "entitlement" is a separate cate-
gory protected by the Due Process Clause. Slawik held that while
an elected office is not "property" under Board of Regents of State
" In other words, states may prefer the "trust" view to the "property" view if they
fear federal review of state political procedures, such as the review of a legislature's
codified procedures for removal of elected officials. But the Supreme Court's holding in
Atkins v Parker, 472 US 115 (1985), should alleviate that fear, since the Atkins Court sug-
gested that due process requirements are met whenever a legislature exercises its legisla-
tive power. Id at 129-30. Under Atkins, political process is due'process, and therefore
removal of an elected official under constitutionally or legislatively prescribed procedures
will not constitute a denial of federal due process, regardless of whether that office is
viewed as "property" or "trust." However, the more important effect of the property/trust
distinction is the locus of political procedural control within the state, that is, whether the
state legislature or the state courts should determine the extent of an elected official's due
process rights. Atkins does not support this important effect.
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Colleges v Roth,"1 it nevertheless might be an "entitlement" re-
quiring due process protection. This implies that the Roth Court
created a "new" category under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause, a category labeled "entitlement." This argument
is flawed, however, because it contradicts the plain language in
Roth. The Roth Court described "a legitimate claim of entitle-
ment" as a "[c]ertain attribute[] of 'property' interests protected
by procedural due process."02 Thus, "entitlement" is more a
means of identifying an interest as a property right than a means
of protecting an interest that carries no property right.
The second view treats elected offices as per se property
interests. This view of the Supreme Court decisions suggests that
Roth overruled Taylor's second proposition that merely defining
the terms of an office is not enough to create a property interest
in the office. Contrary to the second proposition, this view sug-
gests that after Roth, states "automatically" create property in-
terests in elected offices by merely defining the terms of the enti-
tlement in the office. This view, however, suggests that the Su-
preme Court intended its decision in Roth to take away the
states' power to decide questions relating to internal political
processes-in particular, the power to decide what are acceptable
means for removal of an elected official-without affirmatively
stating its intention to do so. Unless and until the Supreme
Court clearly announces its intention to supplant state authority
over internal political processes, reading such an intent into Roth
seems inappropriate.
The third view treats elected offices as per se positions of
trust, the converse to the preceding view. This argument sug-
gests that Taylor held that elected offices can never be viewed as
anything but positions of trust and therefore are never cognizable
as "property" under the Fourteenth Amendment. To be consis-
tent, this view must distinguish Roth as applying only outside
the context of elected office. However, this view suffers from the
same failings as its counterpart above. The Supreme Court ex-
pressed no greater intention to supplant state authority over
internal political processes in Taylor than it did in Roth; in fact,
the Taylor Court's respect for state power in this area is appar-
ent throughout that opinion.'0 3
101 408 US 564 (1972).
'02 Id at 577.
103 See Taylor v Beckham, 178 US at 578-79, 580.
PROPERTY INTEREST
The final view suggests an important distinction between the
"property" states and the "trust" states by taking into account the
law of trusts. Whereas in the "trust" states the state legislature
is free to define the scope of due process control, in the "property"
states that authority lies with the courts. This view looks at the
property/trust distinction along a different dimension than
Slawik's implied federal/state dimension. Viewed in this light,
the debate concerns state legislative authority versus state judi-
cial control, rather than federal versus state jurisdiction. An
analysis of trust law clarifies this intrastate question.
The law of trusts allows a settlor to reserve the power to
remove the trustee by the terms of the trust, but requires that
the exercise of such power be in accordance with the prescrip-
tions of the trust document.' Extending the "trust" analogy to
elected officials suggests that in a state that views elected offi-
cials as trustees, the state legislature may reserve the power to
remove an elected official, but such removal must be in accor-
dance with legislative procedures. The legislature's analogous
"trust documents" are statutes and ordinances. Thus, if a statute
or ordinance reserves the power to remove an elected official
from a position of trust, any removal in accordance with this
power should escape a due process claim.
Continuing the analogy, the legislature acts as settlor in
creating the trust in the interests of the members of the voting
public, the beneficiaries of the trust. Where the terms of the trust
do not limit the settlor's power of removal, the settlor need not
show cause for removal, unless the removal affects the interests
of the beneficiaries.0 5 The court's power of review in these cas-
es is limited to abuses of removal power. 06 Thus, under this
"trust analogy" view, state legislatures escape judicial procedural
review of nonabusive removals when the statutes and ordinances
do not limit removal power. State courts step in only when the
removal represents an abuse of power. Thus, the court looks only
at the abuse of the power rather than looking at the procedural
aspects of notice and opportunity to be heard.
By contrast, in the "property" states, the authority to control
political procedure lies with the courts, not the legislature. Fur-
thermore, every removal of an elected official becomes a federal
due process question. At first glance, this may not seem problem-
1o4 See May v May, 167 US 310 (1897).
"' See March v Romare, 116 F 355 (5th Cir 1902).
"o Id at 357.
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atic-there should be some level of protection against arbitrary or
invidious removal of elected officials, just as the Fourteenth
Amendment provides protection against denial of welfare bene-
fits, social security, or civil-service employment without due pro-
cess. But "trust" states provide this same protection, at least in
the case of abusive removals, without extending federal property
rights to elected officials. Furthermore, in the case of state and
local elected officials, the benefits of office are not as personal, or
individual, as the benefits protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.107
As an illustration, consider the possible implications of redis-
tricting, campaign-finance reform, or alternative voting regimes
under both the "property" and "trust" views. An elected official
might contend that such schemes affect the property interests
inherent in elected offices and therefore constitute deprivations
in violation of the Due Process Clause. If states choose the "prop-
erty" view, the federal courts might have jurisdiction and the
official might have a federal cause of action, regardless of the
intent or impact of any legislation. The elected official might
thereby thwart beneficial election law reform for purely self-in-
terested reasons. On the other hand, the operative default rule
under the "trust" view allows the courts to refuse jurisdiction if
the legislature has not violated the terms of the "trust" or abused
its removal power in enacting election reform legislation. The
"trust" view thus avoids problems that may arise when an elected
official's personal interests conflict with the best interests of the
state.
Under this framework, a state choosing the default "trust"
regime will provide the state legislature with a great deal of
latitude in controlling local political procedural matters, while
maintaining state judicial review of abusive removals. Moreover,
state courts will have flexibility in fashioning a state standard
for abuse of removal authority. A state choosing the "property"
regime, on the other hand, will allow elected officials to create a
federal cause of action even where only nonmonetary and purely
self-concerned interests in an office are threatened. Since the
"trust" regime allows states to provide due process under state
standards, and since the "property" regime removes state politi-
107 This Comment is concerned only with the nonmonetary benefits of office. See note
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cal procedural matters from the state forum and places them in
the federal forum, it is never in a state's interests to choose the
"property" regime.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's 1900 decision in Taylor v Beckham"0 8
advanced two basic propositions concerning property interests in
elected offices. First, unless states choose otherwise, elected offi-
cials have no inherent property interests in their positions. Sec-
ond, states must do more than simply define the length of the
term of an office in order to create a property interest in the
office itself. These two propositions have been contorted and con-
fused in recent lower court cases, but an analysis of modern
Supreme Court decisions suggests that the propositions remain
valid today.
Although the lower courts almost uniformly fail to address
the practical effects of viewing elected offices as "trusts" rather
than "property," one clear implication is that the "trust" view
allows the locus of control over political procedural matters to
remain with the states, and more particularly with the state
legislatures. Furthermore, a "trust" regime allows state legisla-
tures to define political procedures through legislation and allows
state courts to fashion a flexible state due process standard for
reviewing abusive removals of elected officials. Under this frame-
work, states should never choose to create property interests in
elected offices.
'0 178 US 548 (1900).
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